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The focus of the current study is on intuitive feelings of insight during problem solving and
the extent to which such feelings are predictive of successful problem solving. We report
the results from an experiment (N = 51) that applied a procedure where the to-be-solved
problems were 32 short (15 s) video recordings of magic tricks. The procedure included
metacognitive ratings similar to the “warmth ratings” previously used by Metcalfe and
colleagues, as well as confidence ratings. At regular intervals during problem solving,
participants indicated the perceived closeness to the correct solution. Participants also
indicated directly whether each problem was solved by insight or not. Problems that
people claimed were solved by insight were characterized by higher accuracy and
higher confidence than noninsight solutions. There was no difference between the two
types of solution in warmth ratings, however. Confidence ratings were more strongly
associated with solution accuracy for noninsight than insight trials. Moreover, for insight
trials the participants were more likely to repeat their incorrect solutions on a subsequent
recognition test. The results have implications for understanding people’s metacognitive
awareness of the cognitive processes involved in problem solving. They also have general
implications for our understanding of how intuition and insight are related.
Keywords: intuition, insight, magic, aha! experience, problem solving, metacognitive feelings, warmth ratings,
confidence ratings
INTRODUCTION
Experiences of insight may occur in many different domains—both in cognitive activities like
perception, language comprehension, and problem solving, as well as during moments of
self-awareness in clinical psychological settings (Kounios and Beeman, 2014). The focus of the
current paper is on insight experiences in a special kind of problem solving during which the
individual is trying to figure out how a magic trick was done. Sometimes, as in other kinds of
problem solving, such solutions are characterized by their sudden appearance, and by a special
feeling state, often referred to as an Aha! experience (e.g., Topolinski and Reber, 2010; Salvi et al.,
2016). In line with focus of the research topic, we ask whether problem solving of magic tricks that
occurs with or without the Aha! experience is differentially reflected on intuitive, metacognitive
feelings during and after the solution attempt. This would in turn shed light on whether the two
types of problem solving differ in the availability of relevant conscious knowledge.
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The question of how intuition and insight are related
follows from existing debates concerning the involvement
of automatic/unconscious vs. controlled/conscious processes
in insight problem solving. To illustrate this debate, take
two models that both focus on the processes that lead up
to the change in problem representation preceding insight.
According to progress monitoring theory/satisfaction progress
theory (MacGregor et al., 2001) problem solving involves the
conscious, step-by-step monitoring of one’s problem solving
behavior. Twomechanisms are proposed for how thismonitoring
occurs. One is mental simulation, which involves that the
problem solver tries to look ahead and predict the consequences
of future moves. The other is evaluation of prospective
moves against an internal criterion, which makes it possible
to estimate the likelihood of success or failure. For both
mechanisms, the emphasis is on conscious and intentional
planning, monitoring, and evaluation. In contrast, according
to representational change theory (Ohlsson, 1992; Knöblich
et al., 1999), insight problem solving initially involves the
construction of an erroneous problem space. Representational
change can then occur through constraint relaxation, i.e., the
release of unnecessarily constraining assumptions, or chunk
decomposition, i.e., deconstruction of perceptual chunks into
smaller features, which may in turn be recombined into more
productive representations. According to this model, neither
the erroneous problem representation nor the mechanisms that
resolve it, need to involve intentional, conscious deliberation.
Instead, they are assumed to be characterized by automatic
and unconscious processes. Other theories that focus on
unconscious mechanisms in problem solving include those of
Smith and Kounios (1996), and Topolinski and Reber (2010).
The latter theory focuses on the interplay between conscious
and unconscious mechanisms in problem solving, and provides
a framework for understanding how the phenomenology of
insight can be understood as the conscious correlate of processing
fluency caused by a sudden appearance of the solution. It
should be added that one could also assume a continuum of
understanding, from shallow to deep, in which intermediate
levels of understanding are possible. It could also be that the
extent to which a problem representation may be understood in
this way would depend on the complexity of the problem.
Among researchers who acknowledge the role of unconscious
processes in insight problem solving, there is disagreement
over whether insight occurs through a sudden/discontinuous
or gradual/continuous process. Theories that focus on the
mechanisms involved in cognitive restructuring (e.g., Kounios
and Beeman, 2014) would often imply that insight is a
product of non-deliberate, unconscious processing that is
independent of conscious, analytic thought (Smith and Kounios,
1996). An alternative is to regard insight as resulting from
a gradual, more continuous process. The idea is that, over
the course of the problem solving attempt, the problem
representation changes from being unconscious/vague to
becoming conscious/verbalisable. Importantly, this latter view
does not imply any sudden, qualitative shift in information-
processing (e.g., Bowers et al., 1990; Zander et al., 2015).
Central to either view is that the subjective experience of insight
would involve the activation of relevant unconscious/implicit
knowledge. For example, Bowers et al. (1990) referred to an
insight/hunch as involving a behavioral preference for a certain
solution before this solution can be verbalized/justified. Similarly,
Kounios and Beeman (2014) argued for the involvement
of unconscious knowledge in insight problem solving by
referring to findings demonstrating that subliminal priming
may facilitate insight problem solving. A different hypothesis
that seems compatible with a discontinuous view is the one by
Topolinski and Reber (2010), who argued that the subjective
experience of insight reflects increased perceptual fluency
associated with the sudden activation of a solution. Thus,
even though it is commonly agreed that insight would involve
implicit/unconscious knowledge, there is disagreement about the
processes by which such knowledge gives rise to the subjective
experience of insight.
Furthermore, when people solve incrementally by satisficing,
or getting to a “good enough” answer, the answer itself may
be less stable than when they solve by insight. Novick and
Sherman (2003) refer to insight solutions as “pop-out” solutions.
By the Gestalt view of problem solving (see Kounios and Beeman,
2014), insight solutions have a crystallized quality, resulting from
a restructuring of an unstable organization into a new stable
structure. The stability of the solution, and both the correctness
of this new structure and the individual’s confidence in it and
willingness to change it, will be of interest in the present research.
One way to get a better understanding of the relationship
between intuition and insight is to measure intuitive,
metacognitive feelings associated with insight vs. noninsight
solutions to a set of problems, and to measure the relationship
between such feelings and aspects of problem solving. Whereas
the relationship between subjective feelings and unconscious
knowledge has been extensively studied in relation to other
forms of implicit cognition, including implicit learning (e.g.,
Dienes and Scott, 2005; Norman and Price, 2015), the question
of how subjective feelings relate to objective performance at the
different stages of insightful vs. noninsightful problem solving
is still under-explored. A demonstration of whether and how
unconscious knowledge is related to insight requires a clearer
understanding of how subjective feelings relate to objective
performance in problem-solving situations. The focus of the
current paper is on how the two forms of problem solving
differ in terms of the relation between intuitive feelings and
objective performance during and after problem solving, which
would provide an important contribution to the ongoing debate
on the cognitive mechanisms underlying insightful problem
solving.
Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987) studied the relation between
prospective intuitive feelings and objective performance by
asking participants to provide warmth ratings at regular intervals
whilst the person was working on each problem. The question
was whether warmth ratings would predict problem solving
differently depending on whether the problems were multistep
problems/puzzles (e.g., the Tower of Hanoi task), or vignette
descriptions previously demonstrated to give rise to insight
solutions (e.g., the “water lilies problem”). Metcalfe and Wiebe
found that warmth ratings increased gradually before people
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produced the correct solutions to the first type of problem
(referred to as “incremental” problems), but did not increase
much before people gave the correct solutions to the latter kinds
of problems (referred to as “insight” problems). The authors
argued that the difference in phenomenology accompanying
insight and incremental problem solving could be used to define
insight.
However, a limitation of this and other classical paradigms for
studying insight vs. noninsight problem solving relates to the fact
that they make use of two different sets of tasks. When, in studies
like that of Metcalfe andWiebe (1987), participants are presented
with 2 sets of different problems that are predefined to be
associated with either insight or not, behavioral or self-reported
differences between the two could also be attributed to factors
other than those related to information-processing differences
associated with the presence or absence of insight. For example,
tasks could differ in terms of difficulty, motivation/engagement,
the number of steps needed for solution, or involvement of prior
knowledge (see also Bowden, 1997; Bowden et al., 2005; Kounios
and Beeman, 2014, for similar arguments). In addition, it has
recently been argued that the use of pre-defined insight problems
may be problematic because correct solutions to these problems
are not always characterized by Aha! experiences (Danek et al.,
2016).
Danek et al. (2013, 2014a,b) developed a novel experimental
paradigm to counter these limitations. Rather than presenting
participants with different sets of problems that were pre-
defined to be associated with insight or not, their experimental
stimuli were a series video recordings of magic tricks. Their
assumption was that magic tricks can potentially be solved
with or without insight. They argued that magic tricks can
sometimes be solved with sudden insight that occurs as a
result of constraint relaxation. However, they may also be
solved in a step-by-step manner, which involves that the person
systematically considers different possibilities (Danek et al.,
2014a). The researchers therefore asked participants to report,
for each suggested solution, whether or not the solution was
associated with the experience of insight. As predicted, Danek
et al. found that some solutions were associated with insight
whereas others were not. Importantly, they also found that the
two types of solution were associated with measurable differences
on a number of dependent variables. Insight solutions were more
likely to be accurate, occurred after fewer presentations, and
were associated with higher levels of confidence than noninsight
solutions. Furthermore, in a different paper reporting results
from the same experiment (Danek et al., 2013), it was found that
insight solutions were also remembered more accurately. Danek
et al. interpreted these results as supporting the idea that problem
solving characterized by insight is qualitatively different from
problem solving without insight. It should be noted that since
such a procedure does not make claims about which problems
are more likely to be solved with or without insight based on, e.g.,
assumptions about the necessary problem solving steps involved.
Instead, the focus is on the subjective experience of insight/Aha!
In the remainder of the paper, we refer to problem solving
characterized by this form of subjective experience as “insight
problem solving.”
Importantly, such a procedure makes it possible to explore
the relationship between intuitive feelings (of, e.g., warmth and
confidence) and objective indices of problem solving across
the two types of solution, without the possible confounding
influence of task differences. Thus, the procedure can be used
to address whether the two forms of problem solving differ in
terms of conscious availability of relevant knowledge. However,
the specific procedure used by Danek et al. also had some
limitations. First, their definition of insight specifically stated
that it is characterized by high confidence. Participants were
told that an Aha! experience would be characterized by feeling
“relatively confident that your solution is correct” (p. 662). To
circumvent the potential risk of demand characteristics, in the
experiment that we present here, we took care to not include
any information concerning confidence in the definition we gave
participants about what comprised an insight solution.Moreover,
in the earlier work of Danek et al., the measure of solution
time could be criticized for low precision. Because their measure
was the number of presentations (from 1 to 3) rather than
absolute solution time in seconds, the true difference in solution
time within a single category might be larger than between
categories. We standardized the duration of each video, and used
milliseconds as the measurement of solution time1. Furthermore,
they did not systematically assess the relationship between
confidence and accuracy, which could have given insights into
the conscious status of activated knowledge. To explore this we
measured the confidence related to the accuracy for each solution
type. Additionally, their sole measure of intuitive feelings was
retrospective confidence, and they also did not include any
measurement of intuitive feelings during the solution attempt.
In the present study we evaluate intuitive feelings of nearness
to the solution before the solution is given, in a manner similar
to Metcalfe and Wiebe’s warmth ratings. Finally, they had no
measure of the stability of the solutions once they had been
given. If insight solutions were more crystallized than noninsight
solutions it would be expected that people would be unlikely to
change them. Therefore, the tendency to hold on to the suggested
solution was measured by including a multiple choice task giving
several options for possible solutions.
Aims of Current Study
The main aim of the current study was to explore whether the
relationship between intuitive feelings and behavioral measures
differed for solutions characterized by insight vs. solutions that
were not, when the to-be-solved problems weremagic tricks. This
would in turn contribute to our understanding of the availability
of conscious knowledge in the two forms of problem solving. We
both asked participants to provide prospective warmth ratings
while working on each problem, as well as confidence ratings
after having provided a suggested solution. Based on previous
findings (Danek et al., 2014b), we predicted that the two types
of solution would differ with respect to solution time, accuracy,
and confidence. If our subjective measures of confidence and
warmth were found to be more strongly related to objective
1In our view, the advantages of controlling for duration are larger than the possible
limitations associated with this procedure (e.g., that the complexity of tricks cannot
be varied within a single experiment).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1314
Hedne et al. Intuitive Feelings
indices of problem solving for noninsight than insight problems,
this would support the view that insight to a larger extent involves
implicit/unconscious knowledge. Although our study alone is
not designed to directly test whether insightful problem solving
reflects a continuous or discontinuous process, a similar pattern
of equally predictive warmth and confidence ratings across the
two types of solution would be compatible with a continuous
view of insight. We were also interested in whether the insight
solutions were more stable than the noninsight solutions, and
this was tested by comparing the stability between the suggested
solution and the subsequent multiple choice. In conjunction
with the multiple choice task participants would also report
their decision strategy, where one of the options described
having chosen the alternative most closely resembling the already
suggested solution.
METHODS
Participants
Fifty-one students (14 male, 37 female), aged 19–31 (M = 21.81,
SD = 2.55) were recruited from the University of Bergen (The
Faculties of Humanities, Law, Mathematics and Natural Sciences,
Medicine and Dentistry, and Psychology). Each participant
received a gift card of NOK 150 (about 18 USD) as a
compensation for participating. The total duration of the
experiment was between 50 and 70min, depending on howmuch
time participants spent on individual trials. The research was
conducted in accordance with the stipulations of the declaration
of Helsinki, and conformed to the regulations of the Norwegian
Data Protection Official for Research.
Materials
The task was programmed in E-prime 2.0 (Schneider et al.,
2002a,b) and displayed by a 19′′ monitor. All instructions
were in Norwegian, and all written instructions relating to the
experimental procedure were presented on screen. Participants
were tested in groups of 3–5 in individual cubicles in a
psychology testing room. The post-experimental questionnaire
and instructions were presented in paper format.
We reviewed the list of magic tricks presented in Danek
et al. (2014b), and selected tricks based on a number of criteria.
These included timing of individual tricks and variability across
tricks in terms of effect and method. A magic trick consists
of an initial situation, a magic moment, and a revelation (de
Ascanio, 1964/2005), and for a trick to be selected it had to be
structured so that it was possible to clearly present all these three
phases within the time frame of 15 s. The different tricks selected
should also cover a variety of different basic magic effects,
e.g., production, vanish, transformation, penetration (Fitzkee,
1944/1989). Additionally, the methods used to accomplish the
different effects should vary across tricks. Some of the magic
tricks used similar methods to accomplish different magical
effects, whereas other magic tricks used different methods
to accomplish similar effects. Most of the magic tricks were
accomplished using methods specific to those magical effects,
making sure the problems to be solved were all different. All
methods used should be possible to describe in a simple and
straightforward fashion using relatively few words. Each magic
trick was presented as a problem solving task with little or no use
of misdirection or superfluous gestures. Of the 32 magic effects
selected, 20 were used in the study conducted by Danek et al.
(2014b).
On each of the 32 trials, a video was presented that displayed
a professional magician performing a magic trick. The videos
were filmed in a photographic studio and each video clip had
a duration of 15 s. The full clips of three of the tricks are
available online, and are also illustrated by picture sequences in
Figures 1–3 (Example 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_
jE25LbLaoQ/ Figure 1; Example 2: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=YTvTFNnwDEg/ Figure 2; Example 3: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=VqNYrADykUk/ Figure 3). As different
magic tricks require different points of focus from the spectator,
13 of the videos were filmed viewing the magician standing
upright (See Example 1), 6 displayed the magician standing
behind the table (See Example 2), and 13 displayed the magician’s
hands and a tabletop (See Example 3). A full list describing all the
32 magic tricks is provided in the Appendix.
Procedure
Instructions
At the start of the experiment, participants were given verbal
instructions relating to the overall procedure as well as to our
definition of an Aha! experience. This was described as a solution
appearing “out of nowhere” and as being different from other
/ previously suggested solutions. Furthermore, it was instructed
that if they could explain the entire reasoning process leading up
to the solution, this would not be considered an Aha! experience.
The definition was similar to the one used by Danek et al.
(2013, 2014a,b), with the only difference being that we did
not include reference to confidence. Before proceeding to the
experimental procedure, each individual participant was asked by
the experimenter whether they had understood the definition and
whether they had any further questions.
Practice Trials
Participants were first given a practice trial where they were
shown a short and unrelated video clip before being asked to
click on a visual analog scale (VAS). On the second practice trial
they were to watch the unrelated video clip once more and were
instructed to abort the video at a certain point by pressing the
spacebar. Finally they were shown what would be the duration
of the warmth rating (WR) scale in the following procedure
(4000ms), to inform them of how much time they would have
to answer the warmth rating.
Problem Solving Task
The videos of the 32 magic tricks were presented in a different
randomized order for each participant. Each trial consisted of the
initial presentation of the magic trick followed by a WR display
where the participant was to indicate perceived closeness to the
solution.WRwas reported usingmouse click on a VAS consisting
of a bar colored with a blue (“cold”) to red (“warm”) gradient.
The WR scale would disappear after 4000ms if no response was
given. The first WR scale was followed by a break of 11,000ms
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FIGURE 1 | Picture sequence illustrating the magic trick Silk to egg
(Example 1). The full clip is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
_jE25LbLaoQ.
FIGURE 2 | Picture sequence illustrating the magic trick Chop cup
(Example 2). The full clip is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
YTvTFNnwDEg.
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FIGURE 3 | Picture sequence illustrating the magic trick Ball to cube
(Example 3). The full clip is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
VqNYrADykUk.
before another WR scale was shown and then followed by
another presentation of the video. Each video could be displayed
a maximum of 3 times. Every trial sequence would thus include
a maximum of 3 presentations of the given video clip, 2 breaks,
and a total of 5 WRs between each of these presentations/breaks.
Participants were instructed to press the spacebar once they
knew the solution for the magic trick being displayed. Pressing
the spacebar would abort the ongoing sequence, and this could
be done at any point after the first video presentation had
been completed. If the participants did not press the spacebar,
the sequence would run out for the aforementioned maximum
duration. This procedure is depicted in Figure 4.
In all cases, both when the participant would abort the
sequence or if it ended by timeout, the participant was presented
with the question “Did you have an Aha! experience?” They
answered this by indicating “yes” or “no”. An on-screen text
box then appeared, in which they were to type in the solution
for the magic trick, or write “don’t know” if they did not have
any hypotheses for how the trick was done. After having written
the solution they were to report their confidence related to the
suggested solution. This was done using a VAS similar to the WR
scale with a bar colored in gradients from light gray (“not at all
confident”) to dark gray (“totally confident”).
Recognition
After reporting the confidence related to the written solution,
participants were given a multiple choice task of four possible
solutions of which one was the correct solution. This was
followed by a confidence rating similar to that used in the
problem solving task, but was now related to the chosen
alternative. They were finally asked to report the strategy used
for arriving at the chosen alternative, with the alternatives being:
“After looking at and comparing all the four alternatives I chose
the one I thought to be the most probable,” “The moment I
saw one of the alternatives I knew it had to be the correct one,”
“The alternative I chose was the one most similar to my written
solution,” “I felt equally uncertain of all the alternatives and chose
one at random.” The procedure for the problem solving task
and recognition was then repeated until all 32 videos had been
viewed.
Participants did not receive any feedback about the accuracy
of their chosen solution for neither the written description nor
the recognition-task.
Questionnaires
After completing the 32 trials the participants were first given
a questionnaire asking if they knew anyone who had, or had
themselves, been doing magic as a hobby or professionally at any
point in their lives. They were also asked if they had knowledge
about magic beyond what they perceived to be the average.
RESULTS
Rating the Accuracy of Solutions
Initial data analyses excluded single trials where the participants
had reported that they did not know how the magic trick
was done or where no response was given. Two raters (both
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FIGURE 4 | A picture sequence of a trial of the main problem solving task. Each trial consisted of up to 3 presentations of the video, up to 5 warmth ratings, up
to 2 breaks.
professional magicians) scored all the remaining solutions
independently on a 4-alternative scale (completely incorrect-1,
mostly incorrect-2, mostly correct-3, completely correct-4), with
the cutoff for correct/incorrect being 2/3. The 4-alternative scale
was used only for the purpose of scoring, making it evident
which items required the most thorough discussions. Inter-rater
reliability measured using Cronbach’s alpha was 0.911. As a rule
of thumb, if a magic trick involved several minor effects (such
as the vanish and reappearance of a ball), all of these had to be
accounted for if the solution provided were to be rated as correct.
Trials where the raters had scored differently were discussed case-
wise if the ratings were different with regard to incorrect (1
or 2) vs. correct (3 or 4). For the remaining analyses accuracy
of solutions were measured as dichotomous. Trials rated 1 or
2 were given the value 0, and trials rated 3 or 4 were given
value 1.
Time was measured in milliseconds, and warmth and
confidence were measured in whole values ranging from 1 to 100.
Filtering of Data
Several other cases were excluded for different reasons. Cases
where the response given was more than one single solution were
excluded from the analysis both for instances where one of the
suggested solutions were correct and in cases where neither of
the suggested solutions were correct. This was also valid for cases
where the participant would not understand the magic effect.
Cases where the participant did not abort the procedure (i.e.,
timeouts) were also excluded from the further analyses as these
were considered errors of omission (Salvi et al., 2016). Data from
8 of the participants were excluded altogether as they did not
report any Aha! experiences. Trials involving one of the magic
tricks (“Three CardMonte”) were excluded across all participants
as no one reported the correct solution. Finally, several single
trials were excluded in cases where participants reported, either
in the text box during the procedure or in the post-experimental
questionnaire, that they had prior knowledge of how the magic
trick was accomplished. The reason for this filtering was to make
sure that the two groups of solution types did not differ in any
way which might cause erroneous results (e.g., neither timeout
trials nor trials with the response “don’t know” would occur for
insight trials). After excluding trials not fulfilling the set criteria
(661), a total of 971 trials were left for the remaining analyses.
Insight vs. Noninsight Solutions
Of the included trials (N = 971), 29% were reportedly solved
using insight, whereas 71% of the trials were not. There was
substantial variability in the frequency with which different
tricks were solved with or without insight. To illustrate, example
video 1 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jE25LbLaoQ, see
also Figure 1) was the problem most frequently solved with
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insight. In contrast, example video 3 (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=VqNYrADykUk, see also Figure 3) was the problem
least frequently solved with insight.
We will now give an example of how a single magic
trick could be solved both with and without insight. In the
magic trick “Chop Cup” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
YTvTFNnwDEg/ Figure 2), a ball is taken from under a
cup, vanished, and then reappears under the cup. For this
particular magic trick, an understanding of the premise involves
understanding that the ball to vanish is not the same as the
one reappearing under the cup (i.e., the trick involves using two
identical balls). This understanding may take the form of an Aha!
experience. If one has understood this core premise, one can then
deduct from this how the first ball is vanished and the second
one is produced. A noninsight route to the same solution would
be to first realize that the magician does not place the ball to
be vanished in his hand before showing the hand empty. This,
however, will not explain how the ball can reappear under the
cup. Only by then understanding that the ball to appear under the
cup is in fact different from the one vanishing will the spectator
have understood the premise.
A series of t-tests were conducted with self-reported solution
type (insight vs. noninsight) as the independent variable, and
accuracy (correct/incorrect), solution time, and confidence in
the written solution as the dependent variables, respectively. We
expected insight solutions to be associated with higher accuracy,
shorter solution time, and higher confidence. As predicted, there
was a significant difference in solution accuracy in each task for
solutions reported as insight (n = 281, M = 0.57, SD = 0.50)
and solutions reported as noninsight (n = 690, M = 0.37, SD =
0.48); t(506.9) = 5.78, p < 0.001, d = 0.51. The average time spent
before aborting the procedure showed a non-significant trend in
the predicted direction between trials characterized by insight (M
= 38.23, SD = 18.69) vs. noninsight trials (M = 40.56, SD =
19.53); t(969) = 1.705, p = 0.089, d = 0.10. This borderline
trend becomes significant (p < 0.05) with a one-tailed t-test.
Warmth Ratings
Analyses comparing the development of warmth rating across
time for insight vs. noninsight trials only included trials
containing 3 or 4 points of measure. Trials where WR was
reported on all 5 points were already excluded due to the
omission criterion. It was assumed that participants may
sometimes wait for a short time between figuring out the
solution and aborting the procedure2. To avoid this possible
confounding influence, the first WR rating was compared with
the second last (rather than the last) rating. This corresponds
to the procedure used by Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987), who
compared the first WR rating to the last rating before the rating
given with the answer. Trials containing less than 3 points of
data were therefore also excluded from these particular analyses.
Warmth ratings were analyzed in terms of two types of scores that
corresponded to “differential” and “angular” warmth measures
(Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987). Differential warmth was calculated
by subtracting the first value from the last, similar to Metcalfe
2This assumption was confirmed through a questionnaire distributed to a subset
of participants after completion of the experiment.
and Wiebe’s procedure. This raw score could range from -99
to 99. Angular warmth was calculated by dividing differential
warmth by seconds. This is based on a similar reasoning as both
methods will measure development in warmth controlled for
time. We expected to find a higher value for differential and
angular warmth rating on trials not associated with insight.
A set of t-tests showed no significant difference in differential
warmth ratings between trials with solutions characterized by
insight (n = 50, M = 2.92, SD = 23.26) and noninsight
(n = 162, M = 0.30, SD = 19.52); t(210) = 0.79, p = 0.429,
d = 0.12. There was also no significant difference in angular
warmth ratings between trials with solutions characterized by
insight (M =.41, SD = 2.60) and noninsight (M = −0.004,
SD = 0.29); t(49.36) = 1.12, p = 0.266, d = 0.22. Although,
as noted above, the last warmth rating probably should not be
included in the analysis, when we did include it, the means for
insight and noninsight solutions with the different analyses were
12.93 (SD = 18.87) and 11.65 (SD = 16.38) (differential warmth,
t(239.38) = 0.72, p = 0.47, d = 0.07), and 0.24 (SD = 0.36) and
0.22 (SD = 0.31) (angular warmth, t(239.84) = 0.82, p = 0.42,
d = 0.08), respectively. Thus, these findings contrast with the
earlier findings of Metcalfe and Wiebe.
Confidence
There was a significant difference in mean confidence between
insight (M = 78.32, SD = 20.35) and noninsight (M = 68.95,
SD = 23.96); t(606.8) = 6.17, p < 0.001, d = 0.50. This
finding is important as participants in previous studies were
explicitly instructed that they would bemore confident on insight
than noninsight solutions. Our instruction did not mention
confidence, and yet participants were, in fact, more confident
about insight solutions.
In order to compare the relationship between confidence and
accuracy separately for the different solution types, two sets
of analyses were conducted, one of which used mean values
(i.e., trial based) and the other signal detection statistics (i.e.,
participant based). First, t-tests were conducted examining each
solution type respectively, with accuracy treated as if it were
an independent variable. For insight solutions confidence was
significantly higher for correct (n = 160,M = 81.34, SD= 17.16)
than incorrect trials (n = 121, M = 74.32, SD = 23.41);
t(210.97) = 2.78, p < 0.01, d = 0.34. The same was true
for noninsight solutions, where mean confidence was higher for
correct (n = 254, M = 74.31, SD = 22.73) than incorrect trials
(n = 436, M = 65.83, SD = 24.14); t(688) = 4.55, p < 0.001,
d = 0.36.
The relationship between confidence and accuracy in the two
conditions was compared using the signal detection theory (SDT)
statistic Az (Macmillan and Creelman, 2004; Norman and Price,
2015). This is calculated from performance across the different
values of the rating scale, and corresponds to the area under the
SDT ROC curve. This area expresses the “probability of being
correct for a given level of confidence” and can be regarded as
indicative of the individual’s metacognitive ability (Song et al.,
2011, p. 1789). An Az score of 1 indicates perfect discrimination
between correct and incorrect answers, and an Az score of 0.5
indicates random responding. Note that Az scores need to be
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calculated for each individual subject; thus, the following analyses
are subject-based rather than trial-based.
Comparing the Az scores between insight (M = 0.56,
SD = 0.28) and noninsight trials (M = 0.63, SD = 0.18) in
the 33 participants who had a valid Az score for both types
of trials3, there was no significant difference between the two
groups t(32) = 1.06, p = 0.297, d = 0.30. There was also no
significant difference from random responding (0.5) in mean Az
score for trials associated with insight (M = 0.57, SD = 0.28)4;
t(33) = 1.51, p = 0.142, d = 0.25. For trials not associated with
insight, though, mean Az scores were significantly higher than
what would result from a random assumption, (M = 0.64, SD =
0.17); t(41) = 5.43, p < 0.001, d = 0.82. Thus, when a person
solved with insight they seemed unable to judge whether they
were right or wrong, whereas they could make this distinction
when they produced a noninsight response.
Recognition
To evaluate whether people were differentially persevering with
the responses they had produced when they had experienced
insight or not, we separated trials on which participants indicated
that they chose the alternative most similar to their written
solution, from those on which they claimed to have recognized
the chosen alternative using any other strategy. Reported decision
strategy was recoded as a dichotomous variable (“The alternative
I chose was the one most similar to my written solution”—
1; “other strategies”—0). Comparing the two sets of strategies,
there was a significant difference between trials associated with
insight (M = 0.72, SD = 0.45) vs. noninsight attributions (M =
0.61, SD = 0.49); t(969) = 3.37, p = 0.001, d = 0.23. When
analysing trials where the written solution was correct, there was
no significant difference between insight (M = 0.79, SD = 0.41)
and noninsight (M = 0.78, SD = 0.41); t(412) = 0.25, p = 0.80,
d = 0.02. For trials where the written solution was incorrect,
there was a significant difference between insight (M = 0.63, SD
= 0.49) and noninsight (M = 0.51, SD = 0.50); t(196.58) = 2.41,
p = 0.017, d = 0.24, indicating that participants had a stronger
tendency to hold on to incorrect solutions for trials recognized by
insight than noninsight.
DISCUSSION
In the present study we explored whether the relationship
between metacognitive, “intuitive” feelings and objective indices
of problem solving differed for insight vs. noninsight solutions
when the to-be-solved problems were magic tricks (cf. Danek
et al., 2013). The aim was to increase our understanding of the
conscious availability of relevant knowledge in the two forms of
problem solving, thus contributing to ongoing debates regarding
conscious vs. unconscious processes in problem solving. A
methodological aim was to explore the applicability of magic
tricks as a problem solving task.
3For Az to be calculated, there needs to be at least 1 response in each category
(correct vs. incorrect).
4The means and SD’s differ from the above analyses due to casewise exclusion in
the paired sampled t-tests.
Accuracy and Solution Time
In line with previous findings, insight solutions were more likely
to be correct than noninsight solutions. This result is consistent
with Danek et al.’s findings (2014b) and with notion that insight
nearly always predicts correctness (Ohlsson, 1992; Salvi et al.,
2016). In the present study, several of the trials solved by insight
were incorrect. A reason for this could be that the participants
were ignorant tomagic tricks and their methods, as well as to how
the responses were scored. A response was considered correct
only if it described the actual method used to accomplish the
magic effect. It might be that if a provided solution is feasible
(Danek et al., 2014b), albeit incorrect, the participant has still
understood the basic premise of the problem, without being
aware of the particular details of the method itself. That said, for
most of the problems presented in the current study, only one
solution was possible given the presented context.
Contradicting the results of Danek et al. (2014b), there was
little evidence supporting the hypothesis that solution time would
be shorter for insight trials compared to noninsight trials. This
could be due to differences in experimental design and time
measurements, as the present study featured videos all with a
duration of 15 s, and milliseconds as measurement for solution
time. In the experimental procedure developed by Danek et al.
(2013), the videos lasted between 6 and 80 s, and solution time
was measured as the number of presentations for each video
(1–3). Considering that the magic moment and revelation in a
magic trick usually takes very little time and happens at the end
of the entire magic trick, the initial situation of the magic trick
(de Ascanio, 1964/2005) could then be used to contemplate on
how to solve the problem at hand. For shorter videos, participants
would then in be given less time to solve the problem.
It could be argued that limiting each video clip to 15 s limits
the design to feature simple magic tricks. However, even with
this constraint, one of the magic tricks (Three Card Monte) was
not solved by any of the participants. Using more complex magic
tricks as problems could also give rise to what is perceived as
several possible solutions (Tamariz, 1988), whereas the magic
tricks used wouldmost often only have one possible solution, and
as such be comparable to a puzzle.
Warmth Ratings
Contrary to predictions, there were no differences in the
development of warmth ratings for insight vs. noninsight
solutions. One possible explanation is that the two types of
solution were preceded by the same underlying problem-solving
processes (Bowers et al., 1990; Zander et al., 2015). However, it
could also be related to our measurement procedure. Due to the
aforementioned exclusion criteria, several trials were dismissed
when measuring warmth. Even though participants could report
warmth up to 5 times for each trial, only trials including 3 or
4 warmth ratings were used in the analyses, resulting in the
exclusion of 70% of all trials. 3 or 4 ratings constitute relatively
few data points in this form of analysis, and by comparison, the
original study by Metcalfe andWiebe (1987) allowed for up to 40
warmth ratings per problem.
Another salient difference between Metcalfe and Wiebe’s
(1987) study and the present one is that in the former,
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participants had to be 100% confident in their answer before
providing it. People were not free to give an answer with
low confidence, as they were in the present study. As those
authors noted and as is consistent with the present data, when
a person is working on a problem they may come to a tentative
solution without high confidence. In order to be allowed to
provide that (wrong) answer inMetcalfe andWiebe’s experiment,
they would have to convince themselves that the answer was
correct, or maybe good enough, and increase their confidence
rating about that answer. This increase in confidence due
to allowing that a solution that is not a perfect solution is
actually good enough—the acceptance of a ‘satisficing’ solution—
might itself have accounted for the incrementality seen in their
noninsight condition, and also seen when people were solving
insight problems but produced the wrong answer. Indeed, high
confidence on insight problems just before the answer actually
predicted that a mistake would be produced (Metcalfe, 1986), as
if people might have been going through a self deceptive process
of convincing themselves that a wrong answer was acceptable.
(Note, that in the present study they would have been able to
simply give the wrong response with low confidence).
Confidence Ratings
Although insight and noninsight trials did not differ in terms of
warmth ratings, they differed in terms of confidence ratings given
after arriving at the solutions. This indicated that, cognitively,
they were not identical. The results showed that confidence
reflected solution accuracy more precisely for noninsight than
insight trials. Confidence ratings have previously been used
to measure awareness of knowledge used in problem solving
(Metcalfe, 1986; Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987) as well as in other
types of cognitive tasks, including implicit learning (Shanks and
St. John, 1994; Dienes and Berry, 1997).
In the present study, insight trials were characterized by an
overall stronger conviction that one’s solution was correct, as well
as overall more accurate responding. This is in line with the claim
by Topolinski and Reber (2010) that the experience of insight is
accompanied by a feeling of being right. However, confidence was
in fact less predictive of solution accuracy for insight when this
relationship was compared for correct vs. incorrect trials within
individual participants. The relatively stronger correspondence
between confidence and accuracy on noninsight trials, combined
with the fact that confidence did not predict accuracy above
chance level for insight trials, could be interpreted as indicating
that participants had more metacognitive awareness of the
accuracy of the provided solution on trials not characterized
by insight. The contention that there was a difference between
the two types of problem solving is further supported by
the self-reported decision strategies for recognition judgments.
Participants perseverated more with their incorrect solutions for
insight than noninsight trials, indicating they were more likely to
adjust their solution for the latter.
The finding is also compatible with the idea of high-
confidence responses reflecting higher-quality mental
representations, and with Danek et al.’s (2013) findings
that insight solutions were associated with better long-term
recall. Even though there was no support for the hypothesis that
access to metaknowledge preceding the solution was different
for insight vs. noninsight, the results involving intuitive feelings
and decision strategies occurring after arriving at the solution,
indicated that the two types of problem solving did indeed reflect
qualitatively different processes.
Insight As Reflecting Unconscious
Knowledge
The aim of including metacognitive measures of warmth and
confidence was to make it possible to draw inferences about
the conscious availability of relevant knowledge in the two
forms of problem solving (Norman and Price, 2015). Whereas,
a correspondence between confidence and accuracy indicates
that behavior is influenced by conscious knowledge, the lack of
such correspondence is normally taken to indicate unconscious
knowledge (Dienes and Berry, 1997).
Our finding that confidence was less predictive of accuracy
on insight trials could therefore indicate that such trials were
characterized by relatively less conscious awareness of relevant
knowledge. For example, insight trials may involve less access
to conscious fragment knowledge and/or informative cues related
to the provided solution (e.g., noticing a detail in the scene
that one may use as a basis for subsequent hypothesis testing).
Alternatively, it could be that insight trials are associated with
a deeper understanding of the premise of the problem, but
that this understanding is not fully available to conscious
introspection/verbalisation at the time confidence is rated. If this
is true, one could assume that when having an Aha! experience,
participants first understand the core premise of the magic trick,
and then “fill in the blanks” (Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987; Smith
and Kounios, 1996). The higher accuracy for insight trials could
thus indicate that participants in these cases are more likely
to have understood the problem “more fully”, i.e., to have a
more complete understanding of the problem5 (Dominowski
and Dallob, 1995), whereas for noninsight solutions they may
be more likely to have understood and solved one piece
of the problem whereas other parts are left unsolved. The
relatively lower confidence for (incorrect) noninsight solutions
could then reflect that on noninsight trials, participants were
metacognitively aware that their knowledge/understanding was
partial as opposed to complete. In contrast, on insight trials
participants may intuitively have felt that they had understood
the problem more fully. However, if they lacked conscious access
to the details of this knowledge, they would be less able to
metacognitively monitor its correctness, resulting in a lower
correspondence between confidence and accuracy.
In sum, the confidence results suggest that problem solving
by insight at least partly reflects unconscious knowledge. In
other words, insight reflects more than just conscious, step-
by-step monitoring (MacGregor et al., 2001). Instead, the
results seem more compatible with theories that emphasize
automatic/unconscious cognitive processes in insight problem
solving (e.g., Ohlsson, 1992; Smith and Kounios, 1996; Knöblich
et al., 1999; Topolinski and Reber, 2010).
5for a description of how this can manifest, see the description of the magic trick
“Chop Cup” in the section “Insight vs. noninsight solutions” under Results.
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Even though this conclusion would be stronger if also
supported by the results involving warmth ratings, there are
several reasons why the warmth measurement in the current
experiment was not sensitive to possible differences in the
cognitive processes preceding insight vs. noninsight solutions.
Future studies should measure warmth in ways that avoid
these limitations, which are accounted for in more detail
earlier.
Insight As Resulting from a Continuous or
Discontinuous Process
Insight has been viewed as either a product of a discontinuous
(e.g., Kounios and Beeman, 2014) or continuous process
(e.g., Bowers et al., 1990; Zander et al., 2015), and a better
understanding of whether insight is preceded by intuitive feelings
or whether it reflects a sudden shift in information-processing
is clearly needed. The fact that insight solutions were associated
with higher accuracy and confidence compared to noninsight
solutions, and also displayed a weak trend for shorter solution
time, could be taken to support a discontinuous view. The same
holds for the findings that insight solutions were characterized
by a weaker correspondence between confidence and accuracy,
and a stronger tendency to hold on to the provided solution,
than noninsight solutions. Even though these findings are related
to what happens after the insight has occurred, they could
nevertheless be used to argue for qualitative differences between
the two types of problem solving. In contrast, the lack of
difference in warmth ratings between insight and noninsight
trials does lend support to the continuous view. Thus, together
the results do not give a clear answer to the question of continuity.
In order to provide a clearer answer to this question, future
studies should include additional measures of intuitive feelings
and a larger number of measurement points. More specifically,
additional points of data for intuitive feelings that occur
before arriving at the solution would increase the experiment’s
sensitivity in reflecting possible differences in the development of
warmth ratings across the two types of trials.
Limitations and Future Directions
Even though self-reported Aha! experience is by many regarded
as indicative of insight problem solving (e.g., Bowden et al., 2005;
Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2007; Sandkühler and Bhattacharya,
2008; Danek et al., 2016), there is still a concern that what we here
classify as insight solutions were not necessarily arrived upon
exclusively through insight, or that noninsight solutions did not
purely reflect an incremental process. Instead, some solutions
may have been reached through a combination of both. The fact
that the problems to be solved were all from the same set of tasks
may even have increased the possibility that participants used
largely similar strategies appraising each problem across different
trials. This could be due to the aforementioned issue relating
to participants receiving feedback, as well as a consideration
that magic tricks as a problem solving task cannot necessarily
be separated into categories of purely insight or incremental
problems. If this was the case, this may to a certain extent explain
why warmth ratings were not more different across the two types
of trials. However, the fact that the two types of solution were
subjectively experienced by participants as being different, and
the fact that participants tended to hold on to their suggested
solutions more strongly on high-confidence insight trials, both
go against this possible criticism.
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APPENDIX
Trick name Magic effect
Appearing cane A silk handkerchief transforms into a cane
Appearing pole A long pole is pulled out of a suitcase
Appearing silk∗ A silk handkerchief appears out of thin air
Ball to cube∗ A ball turns into a cube
Chop cup A ball disappears from the hands and reappears under a cup previously shown empty
Coin through silk∗ A coin penetrates a silk handkerchief
Color changing cards 1 A queen of clubs transforms into a queen of spades
Color changing cards 2∗ Two playing cards, one in a glass and the other under a handkerchief, switch places
Color changing knives∗ A yellow knife changes color to red
Floating cigarette A cigarette floats under the magician’s control
Floating match A matchstick floats over a playing card
Fork and spoon∗ A spoon and a fork switch places
Ghost card∗ A playing card is seen turning over by no visible aid
Linking rings Two metallic rings are linked and unlinked
Match through match∗ Two matchsticks are seen penetrating each other without breaking
Matrix Four coins move from separate corners of a table to a single corner
Moving coin Two coins are shown, one of which travels from one hand to the other
Multiplying balls∗ One white ball turns into two and then back to one
Orange to apple∗ An orange transforms into an apple
Paper to money∗ Blank sheets of paper are transformed into banknotes
Pen through banknote∗ A pen is pushed through a banknote without the banknote taking any damage.
Rubik’s cube∗ An unsolved Rubik’s cube is solved after being tossed into the air
Shuffled/unshuffled The cards are seen mixed face-up/face-down, before all facing the same way
Silk to egg∗ A silk handkerchief transforms into an egg
Stick from purse A long stick is pulled out of a small purse
Three card monte∗† Three playing cards are seen, two of the cards switch places
Torn and restored playing card∗ A playing card is torn and then restored
Vanishing bottle∗ A beer bottle is placed in a paper bag and vanishes
Vanishing card case A deck of cards in a case is seen placed into a black container, and then vanished
Vanishing coin∗ A coin vanishes from the magicians hand and then reappears
Vanishing glass∗ A drinking glass is covered and vanished
Water to ice∗ Water is poured into a cup and then turned to ice cubes
∗This or a similar magic trick was also reported being used by Danek et al. (2014b). The presentation of the trick as well as the method used to achieve the desired effect might be
different.
†
This magic trick was excluded from the analyses because no participant provided a correct response.
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